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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4512-
This article studies the extent to which participation 
in productive associations in Nicaragua contributes to 
increase individuals’ access to social programs and credit 
services.  By participating in productive associations, 
individuals give a good signal to firms and are rewarded 
with better transactions and more access to the services 
they provide, ceteris paribus. Estimates using 2005 data 
indicate that households that participate in productive 
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associations display higher access to credit and to social 
programs that promote investment. Additionally, 
participation in productive associations is weakly 
associated to more favorable credit outcomes among 
those households that receive loans, such as lower interest 
rates and a lower probability of wanting more credit than 
what was accessible to them.   
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This article studies the extent to which participation in productive associations in 
Nicaragua (i.e. credit unions, professional associations, and local committees) contributes 
to increase individuals’ access to credit and to social programs that promote investment. 
Access to networks and associations has become a mechanism for households to 
promote social participation, empowerment, and better access to services (World Bank, 
2007). Participation in associations is important to access markets and inputs (e.g. 
producer associations); to protect individuals against other institutions (e.g. unions and 
consumer associations); to gain political power (community committees); and to access 
goods, programs, or services (e.g. professional associations). For instance, according to 
World Bank (2007), participation in productive organizations in Nicaragua increases the 
probability that households benefit from social programs (utility programs, titling programs, 
agriculture programs, and health and education programs) by 15 to 16 percent.  
The government of Nicaragua largely promotes the existence of associations as 
providers of goods and services, especially in areas where the presence of the state 
remains weak. Indeed, producer associations in Nicaragua are thoroughly protected under 
the Municipality Law (Law 45) and the Social Participation Law (Law 475) of 2003. 
Lack of institutional quality calls for alternative ways to cope with resource allocations 
and other functions high-quality institutions generally perform. Governance indicators for 
year 2007 (see Kaufmann el at 2007) indicate that institutions in Nicaragua remain weak, 
particularly in areas concerning government effectiveness and rule of law. Nicaragua’s 
institutional efficiency ranks below the world’s twentieth percentile. All these facts make 
Nicaragua an interesting study-case for identifying the role of associations as alternative 
mechanism to access services, such as social programs and credit.  
Associations are broadly defined as a group of people who enter into an 
agreement to reach an end. The concept of association is usually related in the literature 
with the concept of social capital, defined as features of social life (networks, norms and 
trust) that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives 
(Putnam, 1995b). Associations usually solve a collective action problem and could act as 
vehicles for gaining trust (Wollebaek and Selle, 2002; Putnam, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 
2000). By gaining trust, firms may be more willing to provide individuals who belong to 
an association with services and programs (such as micro-credits and other programs 
targeted to the “working” poor) than if otherwise, especially in environments 
characterized by asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  
Our hypothesis is that by participating in associations, individuals give a “good 
signal” to public and private firms and are rewarded with better transactions and more 
access to the services they provide, ceteris paribus. This can be true to the extent that 
associations are somehow exclusive and costly. Some professional associations call for 
specialized experience, skill requirements, and may involve direct and indirect costs 
(such as membership fees and volunteer work). As such, not everybody may be able to 
afford or to qualify to participate in these associations. Being part of an association 
instills in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness that 
could make participants more trustworthy (Putnam, 1993).  In the context of this article, and without loss of generality, private firms are 
lenders (looking for creditors) and public firms are welfare-offices (seeking beneficiaries 
for their programs). For lenders, loan decisions are usually complex in environments 
where asymmetric information abounds (Weiss and Stiglitz, 1981). Lenders, besides 
looking at observable characteristics of potential creditors, would also like to know if 
they have not only the ability, but also the intention of repaying their loan (i.e. they 
would like to know their ‘trustworthiness’ as potential clients).  
Signals of ‘trustworthiness’ are also valuable in the public sector. For instance, in 
order to implement social assistance programs to promote investment among the poor 
(such as housing programs, programs to provide farmers with improved seeds, or 
conditional cash transfers for families who send their children to school), public entities 
need to identify beneficiaries who will make the right use of public funds, who will honor 
the conditions set by the program, and who will make good use of the assets provided by 
the program.  
Our estimates indicate that households that participate in productive associations 
in Nicaragua (defined as those who seek tangible benefits for their members and their 
communities; such as professional associations, local committees, and credit unions) 
display higher access to credit and to social programs that promote investment, such as 
housing and agricultural programs. Using quasi-randomized experimental techniques, we 
find that household participation in productive associations increases the probability of 
having benefited from agricultural and housing programs by 2 to 8%. Furthermore, 
participation in productive associations (excluding credit unions) increases the 
probability of having received a loan by 6 to 10%. Additionally, participation in 
productive associations is weakly linked to more favorable credit outcomes among those 
households who receive loans. Households who participate in productive associations 
obtain 1 to 1.5% lower monthly interest rates on their loans (or 12 to 18% lower interest 
rates per year) and display a 4 to 9% lower probability of wanting more credit, which is a 
proxy for whether or not households with access to loans were able to satisfy their credit 
needs. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses a simple signaling model 
that allows for the possibility that individuals enter associations to distinguish themselves 
as being trustworthy under asymmetric information. Section 3 describes the data and the 
empirical approach to test the main hypothesis. Section 4 summarizes the main results of 
the empirical experiments. A brief conclusion follows in section 5.  
 
2.  An Illustrative Model 
        
This section presents a simple model that illustrates how participating in an 
association may be able to signal trustworthiness of individuals and thereby enhance their 
access and returns to investments offered by firms. The basic idea of the model is that 
belonging to an association gives a “good” signal to firms
1. Individuals (or households) 
who become members of an association pay a cost (i.e. a member’s fee, time, volunteer 
work, etc.) to become a member of the association. The expected return for this 
investment is to achieve a signal of trustworthiness visible to firms that will enhance the 
                                                 
1 We follow Spence (1973, 1974) approach to model signaling. return of the assets they provide. We assume that “trustworthy” signals are visible to 
firms. 
 Suppose for simplicity that there are two types of individuals, high trustworthy 
() h θ   and low trustworthy() l θ .  The individuals know if they are trustworthy or not, but 
firms do not observe this directly. The fraction of high trustworthy individuals in the 
population isλ . Once a service or program is given to an individual (i.e. an investment), 
it achieves a return according to the trustworthiness of individuals. High trustworthy 
individuals achieve a return, , and low trustworthy individuals achieve a return,  .   h r l r
In addition, individuals can send a signal to firms by participating in an 
association. The cost of participating in an association is different for different types of 
individuals. The crucial assumption is that , that is, being part of an association is 
more costly for low trustworthy individuals. The rationale for this assumption is that for 
low trustworthy individuals, there is a higher cost of mingling and participating in 
associations, of taking part in the association’s activities, and of strengthening 
relationships with citizens in the community. Furthermore, being part of these 
associations may come with some responsibilities, fees, requirements, and rules of 
conduct that low trustworthy individuals may not be willing to abide by. This assumption 
is usually known as the “single-crossing” assumption: whereby the indifference curves of 
high and low trustworthy types intersect only once in the signal space. We also assume 
for simplicity that there are no principal-agent problems within associations, that the 
government acts as a benevolent monarch, and that there are a large number of risk-
neutral firms.  
h l c c >
Once individuals decide to be or not to be part of an association, they receive a 
return based on their expected trustworthiness. This is a game of incomplete information 
where the informed party (i.e. individuals) moves first.  
Let  denote an indicator function of whether a member is part of an association 
(denoted by a). Firms choose to give rewards to individuals conditional on participating 
on an association, denoted by: 
Γ
h r a = = Γ ) 1 ( > l r a = = Γ ) 0 ( ,      (1) 
Note that these rewards are conditioned on being part of a productive association 
and not directly on trustworthiness, since trustworthiness is not observable by the firms. 
Suppose further that,                                  
l h l h h c r r c r − > > −     (2) 
Equation (2) holds partly because l h c c < . This assumption, albeit simple, is not 
innocuous as it allows for the signal to solve the problem of asymmetry of information 
between the parties. The assumption assures that the returns of the signal for  h θ  ( l θ ) 
individuals are positive (negative). This occurs because the cost for low trustworthy types 
to send the signal is so expensive that it washes away any potential benefit. If the 
assumption does not hold and either   l h c r l r − <  or   l h h r c r < − , the signal would not be 
useful in order to solve the asymmetry of information. 
Let now check that we are on a separating equilibrium where no deviation is a 
best response. High trustworthy individuals may decide not participate in an association 
and get   or to participate and get l r a = = Γ ) 0 ( h h h c r c a − = − = Γ ) 1 ( . However, they will 
always decide to participate given the assumptions highlighted in (2). Similarly, suppose that a low trustworthy individual decides to participate in an association and 
get . This decision is not in his best interest given the assumptions in (2). 
Therefore, low trustworthy individuals decide not to participate in associations while high 
trustworthy individuals decide to do so. Notice that under perfect information (i.e. the 
individual’s type is public knowledge) there would not be individuals willing to pay the 
cost to participate in an association and associations would not exist
l h c r a − = = Γ ) 1 (
2.  















Nevertheless, a separating equilibrium is not the only possible one. A pooling 
equilibrium, where both types choose not to send the signal could also arise. Consider the 
following reward structure:  
h l r r a a λ λ + − = = Γ = = Γ ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ,    (3) 
where 
h l h h r r c r λ λ + − > − ) 1 (  and  l h l c r r − > .   (4) 
Under this set of conditions, no individual has any incentive to participate in an 
association because it is costly and brings no reward. Firms do not believe that members 
of associations are different regarding trustworthiness from non-members.
3  
A simple extension that could be added to the simple model presented above is to 
address what would happen if the problem of asymmetry of information were 
multidimensional (Streb, 2006). Suppose that individuals not only differ in their 
trustworthiness but also in their taste for joining an association. This means, that there are 
people who are gregarious by nature and like to be part of an association. These 
idiosyncratic factors affect the cost of being part of an association. Of course, this 
characteristic may introduce noise into the signal, because it does not tell anything about 
the trustworthiness of individuals. Therefore, there is a risk for the signal to be less 
                                                 
2 This is an extreme result, due to the assumption that being member of an association has no other value 
but to signal trustworthiness. We address this issue when we consider the case of multidimensional 
asymmetry of information. 
3 The literature on game theory is continuously evolving. Many refinements of equilibriums (see Cho and 
Kreps, 1987) could break the pooling equilibrium and bring a separating one where the signal is value by 
the firms.  
1
 Reward   
(e.g Pr (Loan)) 
Pr (Productive 
Association)
h r  
l r  
h θ  
l θ  informative. Assume that this “taste for being part of an association (gregariousness)” can 
be high () h ξ   or low() l ξ . Now we need a modified single-crossing condition in order to 
guarantee the separating equilibrium. 
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( h l h l l h h h h h c r r c r c r ξ θ ξ θ ξ θ − > > − > −  
If this condition holds, it is easy to check that we are on a separating equilibrium 
where high trustworthy individuals will join an association and low trustworthy 
individuals will not
4. 









There are many more extensions that could be added to the simple model 
presented here. For example, we could study what would happen if the government is not 
a benevolent monarch and uses social plans for its own agenda, or if firms have market 
power or if being part of an association not only signals but actually increases the 
trustworthiness of individuals. In this last case, the results of the extension would be 
analogous to those compiled by the literature of human capital accumulation, whereby 
education not only a signals but also increases ability. However, we hope to have been 
able to illustrate a simple point: that under imperfect information from the side of the 
firms, participation in productive associations may increase the returns obtained by 
individual under certain conditions.  
 
3. Empirical  Illustration   
 
The main empirical question in this article consists in testing whether 
participating in productive associations in Nicaragua affects credit outcomes (such as the 
probability of getting a loan and the interest rate on the loan) and the probability of 
benefiting from social assistance programs that promote investment among the poor. Data 
                                                 
4 We will deal with this issue in the empirical section below using a dummy variable that indicates if 
members of the household participate in associations that are not productive and barely have any cost. 
These will allow us to control for the fact that there may be some individuals that have an innate taste for 
being part of an association. 
Pr  (Productive Association) 
   Reward  
(e.g. Pr (Loan)) 
h r  
 
) , ( l h ξ θ  
) , ( h l θ ξ  
1come from the 2005 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medicion de Vida (EMNV) 
developed by the Nicaraguan National Institute of Statistics (INEC). The Survey is 
stratified, nationally representative, and collects information on general attributes of the 
entire population. The sample includes 6,861 observations representative of a population 
of close to 1 million households. The data provide information about participation of 
individuals in the following associations; i) local committees: group of individuals in a 
neighborhood (or village) that advocate to local government in order to attend the 
concerns and needs of the community (such as improving public services or monitoring 
spending); ii) professional associations: group of individuals that unite to promote 
common interests to their profession or sector of employment; iii) credit unions: 
institutions that provide financial services to its members/shareholders; and iv) other type 
of associations, such as religious groups, fraternities, and clubs.  In this paper, we will 
only analyze the signaling impact of local committees, professional associations, and 
credit unions as they seek to obtain tangible economic benefits on behalf of their 
members. For simplicity, we refer to them as productive associations. Of course, when 
analyzing the influence of productive association in credit outcomes, we exclude credit 
unions from the analysis since the main purpose of credit unions is to provide credit 
services to their members. Our objective is then to disentangle the “signaling effect” of 
associations in outcomes (i.e. access to credit and social programs) from the effect in 
outcomes that may arise from the nature of the association).   
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on participation in associations. Columns 1 
through 5 display the share of households having a head with at least one member 
participating in productive and non-productive associations. Column 1 indicates that 
nationally about 6.4% of all households have at least one member participating in a 
productive association, the majority of which reside in rural areas (11% in rural areas vs. 
6% in urban areas). Columns 2, 3, and 4 display respectively the share of households 
participating in local committees, credit unions, and professional associations by regions 
and socio-economic group. Similarly to what occurs nationally, participation in local 
committees and in professional associations is higher in rural areas and among the non-
poor. Household participation in credit unions is larger in urban areas. Column 5 presents 
the share of households having at least one member participating in non-productive 
associations, mainly churches and clubs.  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on access to social programs and credit. 
The 2005 EMNV includes a module that gathers information on whether or not 
households benefited from social programs. Out of a list of 23 programs, we identified 2 
social assistance programs that provide free or subsidized assets to promote investment 
among the poor: agricultural programs and housing programs. Agricultural programs 
include information on three ongoing programs in Nicaragua: libra por libra, huertos 
caseros, and the forestation programs. Data do not permit to analyze each program 
independently. These programs provide households working in agriculture with some 
type of investment asset; such as improved seeds, plants, and trees. Housing programs 
provide households with land, labor, and/or materials to build or remodel their dwelling. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 display the share of households benefiting from the 
aforementioned programs. Descriptive statistics indicate that only about 3 (1) percent of 
all households claim to have benefited from agricultural (housing) programs; most of which live in poor-rural regions (mainly Central and Atlantic) and belong to the poorest 
segments of the population.
5  
Columns 3 and 4 display statistics on access to credit from informal and formal 
sources. Formal credit is that obtained from private banks, the government/MAGFOR, 
micro-finance institutions, credit cards, cooperatives, and non conventional banks. 
Informal credit is that obtained from merchants, informal lenders (known as “usureros”), 
family, and fiends. Results indicate that the majority of loans in Nicaragua are issued by 
informal lenders. Approximately 13% to16% percent of all households in all socio-
economic groups and strata claim to have received a loan from informal sources. Not 
surprisingly, access to formal loans is higher in urban areas (12% vs. 8% in rural areas) 
and among the non-poor (13% vs. 6% among the poor). The analysis that follows 
analyses credit outcomes from both formal and informal credit sources.  
In order to test to whether participation in productive associations signals 
trustworthiness and therefore may enhance access to credit and access to social programs 
that promote investment, we rely on matching techniques. Although fully randomized 
social experiments are considered more appropriate for causal inference (Grossman, 
1994; Holland, 1986; and Newman et. al, 1994), non experimental evaluations provide an 
alternative evaluation method.  
Define a vector of outcomes Yj for each values of MPAj = {0,1}. Let MPA = 1 
denote households with at least one individuals who is are member of productive 
associations and let MPA = 0 denote otherwise. The parameter of interest, denoted by 
REW (reward), shows the difference between outcomes of interest in the treated state (Y1) 
with the outcomes in the control state (Y0) conditional on receiving treatment:   
) 1 | ( ) 1 | (
) 1 | ( ) 1 | (
0 1
0 1
= − = =
= Δ = = − =
MPA Y E MPA Y E
MPA Y E MPA Y Y E REW
    (5) 
 
We are able to observe  ) 1 | ( 1 = MPA Y E from the data but not ) 1 | ( 0 = MPA Y E , 
which is the counterfactual of interest. However, we can observe the average outcome in 
the control state , which we can use as an estimate for the counterfactual. 
The central problem becomes then to obtain a good estimate for the unobservable 
component. Nevertheless, participants and non-participants are different in many ways, 
including the effect of the program. Therefore, 
) 0 | ( 0 = MPA Y E
 ) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 1 = − = ≠ = Δ MPA Y E MPA Y E MPA Y E .   (6)  
 
Propensity score matching provides a way to estimate  ) 1 | ( = Δ MPA Y E  under the 
assumption that, conditional on observable characteristics X, participation is independent 
of outcomes (e.g. treatment status is random conditional on X). This property in known as 
the conditional independence assumption (CIA):  
X MPA Y Y |         ) , ( 1 0 ⊥       ( 7 )  
 
                                                 
5 We are aware that the size of the housing program is small. However, we decided to include it in the 
analysis in order to take advantage of all the data at hand.  Using Dehajia and Wahba’s (2002) methodology, tests on our data suggest that 
the CIA property holds. Furthermore, we assume that CIA is not satisfied given 
observables but would be satisfied if we could observe an additional binary variable 
(following Ichino et al., 2006). The test allows us to simulate this variable in the data and 
used it as an additional matching factor. Then a comparison of the estimates obtained 
with and without matching on this simulated variable tells us to what extent the estimator 
is robust to this specific source of failure of the CIA.  
If the CIA assumption true, then we can estimate REW as using propensity score 
matching techniques (Rosembaum and Rubin, 1983) so that:  
)) ( , 0 | ( )) ( , 1 | (
)) ( , 1 | ( ) (
0 1 X P MPA Y E X P MPA Y E
X P MPA Y E X REW
= − = =
= Δ =
    (8)   
 
Where P(X) = Pr(MPA=1|X) is the propensity score To estimate (8) we rely on 
kernel matching (Epanechnikov and Gaussian kernel). Additionally, to check the 
robustness of our results we use radius matching techniques. We exclude observations 
with matches outside of the boundaries of the common support (or probability of being 




Table 3 presents estimates of the likelihood that households participate in 
productive associations conditional on characteristics such as socio-economic conditions, 
education/employment of the head, and region using a probit model. These variables are 
used to control for observable characteristics in the first step of the matching procedure. 
Results indicate that more educated households are more likely to participate in 
productive associations. Households having a head who attained primary, secondary, and 
tertiary education are 4%, 5%, and 11% more likely to participate in productive 
associations than households having a head with no education. Furthermore, wealthier 
households are also more likely to participate in productive associations. Households in 
the top two quintiles are 5% to 7% more likely to participate in productive associations as 
compared to households in the bottom quintiles.   Households having a self-employed 
head as well as those having a head working in agriculture are 3% more likely to 
participate in productive associations than households having a head working as wage 
earners or in non-agriculture-related activities. Households living in the central region are 
associated with a 4% higher probability of participating in productive associations vs. 
those residing in Managua. All this evidence is in accord with the literature showing that 
the poor and disadvantaged have usually lower rates of participations in community 
associations, not just in Nicaragua but all over the globe (Almond and Verba, 1965; 
Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Ayala, 2000; Gugerty and Kremer, 2006). 
Note that the estimates of the propensity score include a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if a member of the household participates in a non-productive 
association, such as a sport club or religious association. These associations do not have 
high participation costs so they do not necessarily serve to signal trustworthiness under the framework discussed in section 2. However, participation in non-productive 
associations is a useful control for the level of gregariousness of the household. 
6 
  Results of the matching experiments are presented in Table 3. The first set of 
results examine how household participation in productive association influences the 
probability that a households benefits from agriculture and housing programs. For these 
experiments we have 589 observations in the treatment groups (nearly 10 percent of the 
sample) and with 6,064 in the control groups. All observations are in the region of 
common support. Estimates indicate that household participation in productive 
associations increases the probability that households benefits from agricultural programs 
by 6 to 10%. Results are robust to the choice of matching technique and statistically 
significant as suggested by the z-statistics presented in Table 4
7, column 5.  Estimates 
also suggest that participation in productive associations increases the probability that 
households benefit from housing programs by less than 2 percent. However, this last 
result is marginally significant and not robust to the choice of matching techniques. 
Anyhow, the size of the program (i.e. only 1 percent of all households benefit from it) is 
rather small for conducting this type experiment.  
  The second set of results examines how household participation in productive 
associations (excluding credit unions) influences in the probability that households 
received a loan within a year previous to the survey. The experiment is conducted with 
500 observations in the treatment group and with 6,132 in the control group. Estimates 
indicate that household participation in productive associations increases the probability 
of having received a loan by 7 to 10%. As in the previous case, results are robust to the 
choice of matching techniques and statistically significant
8.  
  The third set of results examines the average interest paid among households that 
received a loan. For this experiment we do not have as many degrees of freedom because 
many households do not report the interest rate linked to their loan and also due to the 
common support restriction. The experiment is conducted with 40 observations in the 
treatment group and with 175 in the control group. Results indicate that households that 
participate in productive associations obtain 1 to 1.5% lower monthly interest rates on 
their loans (or 12% to 18% lower interest rates per year). This is a very important result 
and suggests large savings in the cost of money related to participation in productive 
associations. Nevertheless, these results are not robust to all choices of matching 
techniques and the number of observations is not enough to have robust estimates. 
The last set of results examines how household participation in productive 
associations influences the probability that households that received a loan claim to want 
more credit (i.e. this is a proxy of whether or not households with access to loans were 
able to satisfy their credit needs). For this experiment, we lose degrees of freedom as the 
sample includes only those households that received a loan and due to the common 
                                                 
6 In this article we analyze two main outcomes associated with participation in productive associations; 
they are access to credit and participation in social programs. The model presented in Table 2 is the one 
used to estimate the propensity score used to analyze outcomes on participation in social programs. To 
analyze credit outcomes, we changed the specification slightly in order to satisfy the balancing property 
(and excluded credit unions from the analysis). Results are available upon request. We do not present them 
to avoid duplication since they are very similar.     
7 As we acknowledge the work of Abadie et al (2006) we have checked that results do not differ when not 
using boostrap estimation. Results are available upon request. 
8 For the Kernel Gaussian the result is not statistically significant at 95% level of confidence. support restriction. Note that among those that received a credit, about one-fifth said they 
wanted more credit. The experiment is conducted with 123 observations in the treatment 
group and 854 in the control group; all are in the region of common support. Estimates 
indicate that household participation in productive associations decreases the probability 
of wanting more credit (among those who received a loan) by 3 to 9%. As in the previous 
set of results, estimates are significant only at the margin and are not robust to all choices 
of matching techniques. 
  In order to assess the robustness of our estimates to the CIA assumption, we rely 
on including calibrated cofounders to our model following Ichino et al. (2006). The idea 
of the calibrated cofounders is to analyze the extent to which our propensity score model 
missed important variables that may explain the latent distribution of household 
participation in productive associations. This is done by simulating potential cofounders 
in the data, a calibrated cofounder that has a distribution similar to the empirical 
distribution of an important binary covariate, in this case, a dummy variable that is equal 
to one when a household member participates in a non-productive association. By doing 
so, the simulation reveals the extent to which baseline estimates are robust to deviations 
from CIA induced by the impossibility of observing factors similar to those used to 
calibrate the distribution of the cofounder, i.e. being part of a non-productive association.  
Results of the robustness checks are presented in Tables 4A and 4B. In regards to 
our first experiment (i.e. effect of participation on the probability of benefiting from a 
social program in agriculture), estimates using a calibrated cofounder are very similar to 
the baseline estimates. This means that even though the calibrated cofounder inflicts a 
positive effect on the untreated outcome and on the treatment assignment, the effect over 
the estimate is not strong. So, even if we do not include or cannot observe a variable 
similar to the calibrated cofounder, baseline estimations would not changed significantly. 
Altogether, this means that these results are quite robust. In regards to our second 
experiment (i.e. effect of participation on the probability of obtaining credit), the effect of 
the calibrated cofounder in the magnitude of the estimate is negligible. We cannot 
perform cofounder tests in the other experiments (i.e. effect on participation on interest 
rates and on wanting more credit) due to lack of degrees of freedom (i.e. we run into 
multi-colinearity problems by adding cofounders to the model).   
 
5. Conclusions   
 
Results in this article indicate that no matter the level of income (poverty), 
geographic location, sex, skills, occupation, etc. household participation in productive 
associations in Nicaragua contributes to increase household access to credit and to social 
assistance programs that promote investment. Participation in productive associations is 
linked (although weakly) to more favorable credit outcomes among those households that 
receive loans, such as lower interest rates and a lower probability of wanting more credit. 
The results show the relevance of these associations in providing the community with 
better outcomes regarding relationships with the public and private sectors. The results 
also give some theoretical foundations for developing community-based associations 
such as the Self-employed Women’s Association in India, the Orangi Slum Association 
in Pakistan, and the Iringa Nutrition Association in Tanzania, among others (Mansura and 
Rao, 2004). Our theory is that being part of an association signals a participant’s 
trustworthiness and reliability. A key assumption is that trustworthiness is rewarded by 
firms with better transactions and more access to the services they provide. Specialized 
associations that are somehow selective about their members and that involve direct or 
indirect membership costs may contribute to reduce asymmetry of information and 
thereby may be beneficial to enhance credit markets. Furthermore, productive 
associations may help the public sector identify good candidates to benefit from programs 
that require conditionality and targeting.  
Estimates obtained in this article indicate that households that are involved in 
productive associations in Nicaragua are associated with 6% to 10% higher access to 
credit and to social assistance agricultural programs that promote investments, mainly 
among the rural poor.  
Results presented here focus on the signaling impact of productive associations 
(i.e. those that are designed to bring tangible benefits to their members) as opposed to 
that of any other type of association. The logics behind this choice is that productive 
associations usually entail direct or indirect costs to their members, which is the driving 
force that contributes to obtain a signal about their trustworthiness. Nevertheless, other 
non-productive associations, such as some religious groups, may promote values that 
may enhance the trustworthiness of their members. Testing this hypothesis is an 
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 HOUSEHOLD  PARTICIPATION 
Total  6.37 2.30 1.76 4.47  12.50     
Area       
Rural 10.50  3.07  1.19  6.91  13.20 
Urban  6.01 1.75 2.16 2.72  12.00 
Region       
Managua  7.03 1.83 2.95 2.80  16.46 
Pacific  6.69 1.85 1.38 4.21 8.08 
Central  9.98 3.33 1.48 5.90  12.76 
Atlantic 7.15 1.75 0.88 4.89  14.02 
Quintile       
Quintile  1  6.86 2.29 0.13 4.68  10.18 
Quintile  3  8.35 1.77 1.58 5.35  13.41 
Quintile  5  8.78 3.16 2.40 4.37  14.12 
Poverty       
Non  poor  8.66 2.29 0.13 4.68  13.66 





6861 6861 6861   
6861 
Source: Authors using the 2005 Nicaragua EMNV.  Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Household access to credit and social assistance 
programs 
  Benefited from a 
Housing  program 
 
% 




Received  a loan 
from an formal 
creditor 
% 
Received  a loan 
from a informal 
creditor 
% 
Total  1.07 2.63  10.42  15.04 
Area        
Rural  1.52 6.03 7.82 15.5 
Urban 0.74  0.19  12.28  14.71 
Region           
Managua 0.20  1.37  12.79  13.31 
Pacific 0.63  1.34  10.42  15 
Central 2.46  5.03  11.44  17.38 
Atlantic  0.40 2.20 2.95 12.8 
Quintile           
Quintile  1  2.04 4.80 4.11  16.25 
Quintile  3  0.80 3.04 7.09  16.25 
Quintile 5  0.44  1.06  15.89  12.43 
Poverty           
Non poor  0.79  2.03  12.96  14.59 











Source: Authors using the 2005 Nicaragua EMNV. Formal creditors: private banks, 
government/MAGFOR, micro-finance institutions, credit cards, cooperatives, and Non 
conventional banks; Informal Creditors: Merchants, informal lenders or “usureros”, 
family, and fiends.  Social Programs: utility programs, titling programs, agriculture 
programs, and health and education programs Table 3: Direct estimates of the bias in the dependent Variable due to observable 
characteristics [Probit regression] 
Dependent Variable: a member of the household 
participates in a productive association 




Characteristics of the household       
   Log. of Household size  0.01***  0.27***  0.06  0.00 
   Head is indigenous  -0.02  -0.12  0.10  0.22 
   Household is poor  -0.02  -0.12  0.12  0.32 
   Head is male  0.01  0.12  0.09  0.15 
   Age of the head   0.00  -0.01***  0.00  0.01 
   Age of the spouse   0.0009**  0.01**  0.00  0.03 
   Main way is accessible all the time  -0.02***  -0.18***  0.06  0.00 
   Head is widowed  0.06***  0.37***  0.10  0.00 
   Head is living in couple  -0.02  -0.14  0.15  0.35 
   Household owns house   0.01  0.20***  0.07  0.00 
   H. participates in a non-productive organization  0.10***  0.59***  0.06  0.00 
Socio Economic Condition       
    Quintile 2  0.02  0.13  0.08  0.12 
    Quintile 3  0.03*  0.22*  0.12  0.06 
    Quintile 4  0.05**  0.34**  0.14  0.02 
    Quintile 5  0.07***  0.49***  0.15  0.00 
Age Dummies       
   Head have 16-23 years  -0.06***  -1.02***  0.30  0.00 
   Head have 24-33 years  -0.03***  -0.20**  0.08  0.01 
Occupation of the Head       
   Head is self-employed  0.03***  0.22***  0.05  0.00 
    Head works in Commerce  0.00  -0.04  0.08  0.61 
    Head works in Finance  0.08***  0.45***  0.15  0.00 
    Head works for the government  0.01  0.09  0.17  0.60 
    Head works in Agriculture or Mining  0.03***  0.25***  0.07  0.00 
    Spouse is professional  0.03  0.23  0.22  0.31 
Education of the Head       
   Head finished primary school  0.04***  0.27***  0.06  0.00 
   Head finished  secondary school  0.05***  0.34***  0.09  0.00 
   Head finished  technical   0.11***  0.57***  0.14  0.00 
   Head finished  tertiary  0.09***  0.51***  0.12  0.00 
Regions       
   Region: Managua  0.00  -0.02  0.11  0.82 
   Region: Pacific  0.01  0.07  0.07  0.34 
Region: Central  0.04***  0.30***  0.06  0.00 
Source: Authors using the 2005 Nicaragua EMNV. Absolute value of z statistics in 
brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Reference 
categories: education of the head, no education or preschool; socio-economic group, 
poorest quintile; geographic location, Atlantic.  Table 4A: Matching results on Social Assistance [effect of participation in productive association on access to social programs] 









95% Conf.   Interval 
Probability of benefiting from a social program in 
Agriculture (in %)  
          
Kernel Matching (epanechnikov)   588  6,064  8.3%  0.015  5.67  5.4%  11.1% 
Kernel Matching (Gaussian)   588  6,065  6.4%  0.017  3.80  3.1%  9.7% 
Radius Matching  588  6,065  9.57%  0.011  8.99  7.5%  11.6% 
Radius Matching, caliper(0.01)  588  6,064  8.2%  0.016  5.28  5.2%  11.3% 
Radius Matching, caliper(0.05)  589  6,064  8.30%  0.014  5.74  5.5%  11.1% 
Calibrated cofounder
* 






7.7%  0.003 
- - - 
Probability of benefiting from a housing program (in %)            
Kernel Matching (epanechnikov)   588   6,064  1.2%  0.008  1.62  -0.3%  2.8% 
Kernel Matching (Gaussian)   588  6,065  0.3%  0.011  0.31  -1.8%  2.5% 
Radius Matching  588  6,065  1.3%  0.006  2.10  0.1%  2.6% 
Radius Matching, caliper(0.01)  588  6,064  1.3%  0.007  1.84  -0.1%  2.6% 
Radius Matching, caliper(0.05)  588  6,064  1.3%  0.008  1.61  -0.2%  2.8% 
Calibrated cofounder
+ 






1.3%  0.001 
- - - 
Source: Authors using the 2005 Nicaragua EMNV. The program, previous to perform the sensibility analysis, calculates a baseline estimate. In this case using 
kernel matching and only observation on the common support the baseline estimate is: 
* 8.7 percent; and 
+ 1.3 percent. Table 4B: Matching results on Access to Credit [effect of participation in productive association on access to loans] 
   N treated on 
support 
N control on 
support 





95% Conf.   Interval 
Probability of receiving credit         
Kernel Matching (epanechnikov)   499  6,132  8.0%  0.023  3.39    3.4%  12.5% 
Kernel Matching (Gaussian)   499  6,132  6.8%  0.035  1.89    -0.2%  13.9% 
Radius Matching  500  6,132  9.5%  0.017    5.39  6%  13% 
Radius Matching, caliper(0.01)  498  6,130  7.3%  0.024  2.98  2.5%  12% 
Radius Matching, caliper(0.05)  499  6,132  8.0%  0.020  3.96  4%  12% 
Calibrated cofounder
++ 






7.6%  0.003 
- - - 
Less interest rate paid (monthly) in points         
Kernel Matching (epanechnikov)  40  175  -1.48  0.698  -2.12    -2.9  -0.1 
Kernel Matching (Gaussian)  40  175  -0.64  1.580  -0.41  -3.8  2.5 
Radius Matching  40  175  -1.34  0.526   -2.55  -2.4  -0.3 
Radius Matching, caliper(0.01)  40  175  -0.66  1.000  -0.66  -2.6  1.3 
Radius Matching, caliper(0.5)  40  175  -1.55  0.833    -1.86  -3.2  0.1 
Probability of wanting more credit in %                                     
Kernel Matching (epanechnikov)   123  854  -7.2%  0.039  -1.83  -15%  0.5% 
Kernel Matching (Gaussian)   123  854  -3.2%  0.069  -0.46  -17%  10.5% 
Radius Matching  123  854  -9%  0.039  -2.29  -16.6%  -1.3% 
Radius Matching, caliper(0.01)  120  853  -4.8%  0.050  -0.96  -14.6%  5% 
Radius Matching, caliper(0.5)  120  853  -7.2%  0.048  -1.50  -16.6%  2.2% 
Source: Authors using the 2005 Nicaragua EMNV. 
++  The program, previous to perform the sensibility analysis, calculates a baseline estimate. In this case using 
kernel matching and only observation on the common support the baseline estimate is 8.5 %. 
 